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BASIC MIRANDA ANALYSIS
Russell W. Galloway, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can be
used against you. You have the right to talk to a lawyer and
have him present with you while you are being questioned. If
you cannot afford to hire a lawyer one will be appointed to
represent you before any questioning, if you wish one.
This standard litany of Miranda warnings1 is now as familiar
to many Americans as the Pledge of Allegiance. But how does Mi-
randa work? And what's left of this case which the Meese Justice
Department called "the epitome of Warren Court activism in the
criminal law area. " This article describes the basic structure of Mi-
randa analysis. Its purpose is to help law students, lawyers, and
judges understand and apply the diverse strands of Supreme Court
law in this controversial field.
The legal analysis spawned by Miranda may be summarized as
follows:
© 1988 by Russell W. Galloway, Jr.
* Professor, Santa Clara University School of Law; J.D., 1965, Columbia University
School of Law; Director, Supreme Court History Project; member of the California bar.
1. The warnings are derived from the landmark case, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966). Miranda involved four separate criminal prosecutions in which the Court reversed
convictions because statements taken during custodial interrogations were admitted into evi-
dence against the defendants.
2. Report to the Attorney General on the Law of Pre-Trial Interrogation (Markham
Report), Feb. 12, 1986.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
Miranda: Basic Analysis
I. Preliminary questions
A. Does the court have jurisdiction?
B. Is the claim justiciable?
C. Was the harm caused by government action?
II. On the merits: was Miranda violated?
A. Are the Miranda rules applicable?
1. Was a statement obtained by custodial interrogation?
a. Was claimant in custody?
b. Did interrogation occur?
c. Did claimant make a statement in response to the
interrogation?
2. Did the government use the statement in a criminal
prosecution to prove guilt or enhance punishment?
3. Did the need for Miranda protections outweigh other
governmental needs?
B. Did the government comply with the Miranda rules?
1. Were the required warnings given?
2. Did claimant voluntarily and knowingly waive the
Miranda rights?
3. Did the government comply with applicable rules
concerning invocation of the Miranda rights?
III. Remedies: if Miranda was violated, what redress is appropri-
ate?
A. Does the exclusionary rule apply?
B. Does the harmless error rule apply?
As set out in the outline above, a claimant seeking redress for
an alleged violation of Miranda must initially meet three prelimi-
nary requirements.' First, the court must have jurisdiction over the
claim. Second, the claim must be justiciable. Third, the conduct giv-
ing rise to the claim must be government action. Failure to satisfy
any of these requirements normally results in dismissal without
reaching the merits of the Miranda claim.
If claimant satisfies the preliminary requirements, the court will
proceed to the merits of the claim. On the merits, the analysis has
two components.4 First, one must determine whether Miranda is ap-
3. These are standard preliminary requirements that apply throughout constitutional
law.
4. The two-part structure of the analysis is the same for all constitutional limits. In
applying any constitutional restriction on government action, one should ask first whether the
limit is applicable-i.e., is this the kind of government action that is subject to this limit?-and
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plicable, i.e., whether, in prosecuting claimant for crime, the govern-
ment introduced a statement obtained from claimant by custodial in-
terrogation. The court must decide whether claimant was in custody,
whether interrogation occurred, whether claimant's statement was a
response to interrogation, whether the government introduced the
statement in a criminal prosecution to prove guilt or enhance punish-
ment, and whether the need for Miranda protections outweighs
other governmental needs. Miranda is only applicable if all these
requirements are met.
Second, if Miranda is applicable, one must determine whether
the government complied with the Miranda rules. Did the govern-
ment give claimant the required warnings? Did claimant knowingly
and voluntarily waive the Miranda rights prior to the interrogation?
If claimant invoked either of the Miranda rights, i.e., the right to
remain silent or the right to have an attorney present, did the gov-
ernment obey the rules relating to such invocations? Compliance
with Miranda requires that the government satisfy all these
requirements.
If Miranda is inapplicable or the Miranda requirements were
met, the analysis ends. If, on the other hand, Miranda is applicable
and its requirements were not met, one must proceed to the question
of'remedies, i.e., whether the resulting criminal conviction must be
overturned. Here the issues concern the exclusionary rule and the
harmless error rule.




1. Does the court have jurisdiction?
Claimant must show that the court has jurisdiction over the
claim. In most cases, this is not a problem, since Miranda claims
normally arise in criminal prosecutions in which the court has juris-
diction by statute.5
second whether the government complied with the rules the Supreme Court has developed for
enforcing the limit. In short, the analysis on the merits of any constitutional limit focuses on
two questions: (1) applicability and (2) compliance.
5. For example, under the California Penal Code the courts are given statutory jurisdic-
tion. CAL. PENAL CODE § 777 (West 1985).
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2. Is the claim justiciable?
To qualify for a decision on the merits, the claim must involve a
justiciable controversy between adverse parties. In general, this is not
a problem, since Miranda issues arise in criminal prosecutions in-
volving the very real threat of imprisonment and/or fines.
But justiciability issues do surface occasionally in cases raising
Miranda claims. For example, the rule against advisory opinions
prevents federal courts from reaching Miranda issues in cases de-
cided on independent and adequate state grounds. Similarly, the
claim must be ripe and not moot.
Most important, claimant must have standing. The only person
with standing to invoke Miranda is a person whose statement, taken
during custodial interrogation, is offered in evidence in a criminal
prosecution against him. This is because the privilege against self-
incrimination,6 on which Miranda is based, is a personal right that
may not be invoked by third-parties.7
3. Was the harm caused by government action?
The Miranda rules, like most other constitutional limits, apply
only to the government. Custodial interrogation undertaken by a
person acting in a private capacity need not comply with the require-
ments of Miranda. If the interrogation is conducted by a government
official or agent, the government-action requirement is met unless
the interrogation was completely unrelated to the interrogator's offi-
cial duties. If the interrogation is conducted by a private person, e.g.,
a security guard employed by a private corporation, the government
action requirement is not met unless the government either com-
pelled the interrogation or encouraged it so substantially that the de-
cision to interrogate must be attributed to the government.8
If claimant does not satisfy the three preliminary requirements,
6. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
7. E.g., People v. Varnum, 66 Cal. 2d 808, 427 P.2d 772, 59 Cal. Rptr. 108 (1967); see
W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 415-17 (1985).
8. E.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) (due process restrictions are not applica-
ble to private decision to transfer a patient out of a nursing home); Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks,
436 U.S. 149 (1978) (due process restrictions are not applicable to decision of private ware-
houseman to execute warehouseman's lien); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345
(1974) (due process restrictions are not applicable to decisions by privately owned utility com-
pany to cut off customer's gas and electricity). These cases do not involve Miranda problems,
but they are the leading authorities on the government action issue. As the Court stated in
Blum, "[a] state normally can be held responsible for a private decision only when it has
exercised coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert,
that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State." Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004.
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the claim should be dismissed without reaching the merits of the Mi-
ianda issues. If claimant satisfies the preliminary requirements, one
may proceed to evaluate the Miranda claim on the merits.
B. On the Merits: Was Miranda Violated?
1. Is Miranda applicable?
Miranda only applies when the government (a) uses custodial
interrogation to obtain a statement from claimant, (b) introduces the
statement in a criminal prosecution against claimant to prove guilt or
enhance punishment, and (c) has no overriding need for immediate
action beyond the solution of the particular crime. Each of these
three requirements needs to be considered separately.
a. Did claimant make a statement in response to
custodial interrogation?
1) Was claimant in custody?
Miranda applies only to custodial interrogation. Miranda's
premise is that interrogation occurring when one is in police custody
is so coercive that procedural protections are needed to insure that
the suspect is not compelled to incriminate himself in violation of the
privilege against self-incrimination. Without custody, this coercion is
not so likely, so Miranda protections are not required.
The test for determining whether claimant was in custody is
whether a reasonable person would have found the situation approx-
imately as coercive as a custodial arrest.9 Relevant factors include
whether a reasonable person would have believed the detention and
questioning were temporary and whether the situation was so police-
dominated that a reasonable person would have felt at the mercy of
the police.10 On the latter point, relevant factors include the follow-
9. The case in which the Court adopted the objective (reasonable person) test is
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984). In Miranda, the Court stated that its require-
ments apply "when the individual is ... in custody at the station or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477. In later cases, however,
the Court tightened the definition of custody. In Berkemer, for example, the Court held that a
traffic stop did not involve custody although it was conceded to be a sufficient deprivation of
freedom to be a "seizure" within the meaning of the fourth amendment. As the Court stated in
Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977), "Miranda warnings are required only where
there has been such a restriction on a person's freedom as to render him 'in custody.' It was
that sort of coercive environment to which Miranda by its terms was made applicable, and to
which it is limited." Id. at 495.
10. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 437-38.
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ing: location (police station vs. public street or home), number of
police officers present, use of physical restraint (e.g., handcuffs), un-
familiarity of the location, and isolation of claimant." Applying
these factors, the Court has concluded that interrogations at police
stations are normally custodial, but not always. 2 Similarly, interro-
gations at places other than police stations are normally noncus-
todial, but not always." Absent special circumstances, traffic stops
and Terry stops" do not involve custody.'
2) Was the suspect interrogated?
Miranda applies "not where a suspect is simply taken into cus-
tody, but rather where a suspect in custody is subjected to interroga-
tion." 6 Interrogation may involve either: (1) express questions or (2)
the functional equivalent of express questions.' 7
a) Express questions
As a general rule, express questions addressed by government
officials to claimant about the case constitute interrogation. Some ex-
press questions are not interrogation, however. Questions "normally
attendant to arrest and custody" are not interrogation.' For exam-
ple, an inquiry whether claimant will take a blood-alcohol test is not
interrogation.' 9 Similarly, booking inquiries such as "requests to
submit to fingerprinting or photography" do not trigger the Mi-
randa rules.2 Questions that do not call for a response concerning
the merits of the case (e.g., would you like a cup of coffee?) are also
presumably not interrogation. And questions seeking to clarify vol-
unteered statements may not be interrogation. 2'
11. Id.; Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984).
12. For examples of noncustodial station-house interrogations, see California v. Beheler,
463 U.S. 1121 (1983); Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977).
13. For examples of custodial interrogations at locations other than police stations, see
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (supermarket); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S.
291 (1980) (police car); Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969) (claimant's bedroom).
14. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (a "Terry stop" is an investigative detention that
does not rise to the level of a custodial arrest).
15. Berkemer, 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
16. Innis, 446 U.S. at 300.
17. Id. at 300-01 ("We conclude that the Miranda safeguards come into play whenever
a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent.").
18. Id. at 301.
19. South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983).
20. Id. at 564 n.15.
21. W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 301 (1985). The Supreme Court
has not yet ruled on this issue.
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b) Functional equivalent of express questions
Words or actions that do not take the form of express questions
constitute interrogation if the police should know they are reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.2" This is
an objective test that takes into account any special characteristics of
the claimant of which the police should have been aware. The ques-
tion is whether a reasonable officer would have known that, given
the particular characteristics of the suspect, the conduct was reasona-
bly likely to elicit an incriminating response.23
Relevant evidentiary factors concern (1) the police behavior and(2) the characteristics of claimant. In the first class, relevant consid-
erations include how "evocative" the police conduct was, 4 how long
it lasted, and whether it was intended to evoke an incriminating re-
sponse." In the second class, relevant considerations include the sus-
pect's mental capacity, mental state (e.g., disoriented or upset), and
"[a]ny knowledge the police may have had concerning the unusual
susceptibility of a defendant to a particular form of
persuasion . .2.6."'
3) Was claimant's statement a product of custodial
interrogation?
Even if claimant was in custody and interrogation took place,
Miranda only applies if the statement sought to be introduced was a
response to the interrogation. In other words, there is a causation
requirement: the statements must be "the result of police interroga-
tion."'27 A phrase frequently used in discussing this causation re-
22. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301 ("[Tlhe term 'interrogation' under Miranda refers not only
to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police . . . that the
police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the
suspect.").
23. It is not enough that the police conduct is likely to elicit a response from the claim-
ant. The likely response must be incriminating. "By 'incriminating response' we refer to any
response-whether inculpatory or exculpatory-that the prosecution may seek to introduce at
trial." Id. at 301 n.5.
24. The Supreme Court has ruled, however, that several strikingly evocative types of
police conduct taken straight out of interrogation manuals were not the functional equivalent
of interrogation. E.g., Arizona v. Mauro, 107 S. Ct. 1931 (1987) (putting a husband and wife
suspected of murder together and recording their conversation); Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980)(speech about harm a hidden weapon could cause to handicapped children).
25. "[W]here a police practice is designed to elicit an incriminating response from the
accused, it is unlikely that the practice will not also be one which the police should have
known was reasonably likely to have that effect." Id. at 302 n.7.
26. Id. at 302 n.8.
27. Mauro, 107 S. Ct. at 1936 ("[H]is volunteered statements cannot properly be con-
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quirement is "volunteered statements."28 If a statement is volun-
teered, it is not the result of interrogation and is therefore not subject
to the Miranda rules.2
9
b. Did the government introduce claimant's statement
in a criminal prosecution to prove guilt or enhance punishment?
Miranda is not violated when the government simply uses cus-
todial interrogation to obtain a statement without complying with the
Miranda rules. Rather Miranda applies only when the government
seeks to introduce the statement in a criminal prosecution against the
Miranda claimant. Moreover, Miranda does not ban all uses of
such statements in criminal prosecutions. The only uses banned so
far are as evidence to prove guilt" and to enhance the sentence. 1 In
contrast, Miranda does not prohibit use of the statements to impeach
claimant's testimony.3 2
c. Was the need for compliance with the Miranda rules
outweighed by a special need for immediate action?
The Miranda requirements only apply if the need to protect
claimant's fifth amendment rights is not outweighed by a need for
immediate action to achieve an overriding governmental objective."
For example, "[Tihe need for answers to questions in a situation
posing a threat to the public safety outweighs the need for the pro-
phylactic rule protecting the Fifth Amendment's privilege against
self-incrimination."84 Thus, the Miranda rules need not be obeyed
in interrogating an arrestee about the whereabouts of a gun known
sidered the result of police interrogation.").
28. Id.; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478.
29. As the Court put it in Miranda, "Any statement given freely and voluntarily with-
out any compelling influence is, of course, admissible in evidence. . . .Volunteered statements
of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by
our holding today." Id.
30. Id. at 436.
31. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981) (defendant's statements taken during custodial
interrogation without complying with the Miranda rules may not be admitted to prove future
dangerousness at the penalty phase of a capital case).
32. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
The Court in these cases held that when a defendant testifies at his or her trial, statements
taken during custodial interrogation without complying with the Miranda rules may be used
to contradict and cast doubt upon defendant's trial testimony.
33. This "overriding need" rule was created in Quarles, 467 U.S. at 649, where the
Court held that Miranda is subject to a " 'public safety' exception." Id. at 655.
34. Id. at 657.
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to be concealed nearby. 5
Since New York v. Quarles is the only case to apply this rule so
far, the scope of the new exception is unclear. Quarles suggests it is
limited to situations justifying a reasonable belief that immediate
questions and answers are necessary to further an overriding need
beyond the normal need to solve the crime. 6 Whether this "immedi-
ate answer" exception will be extended to public needs other than
physical safety remains to be seen.37
2. Did the government comply with the Miranda rules?
If Miranda is applicable-i.e., if the government, without any
overriding need beyond solving the crime, conducted a custodial in-
terrogation, obtained a statement from defendant, and introduced the
statement in a criminal prosecution against defendant to prove guilt
or enhance the punishment-then the next issue is whether the gov-
ernment complied with "the Miranda rules.""8 These rules fall into
three major categories: (1) warnings, (2) waiver, and (3) invocation
of Miranda rights.
a. Were the required warnings given?
If Miranda is applicable, the government must give the four
famous Miranda warnings before beginning the interrogation. These
warnings are as follows:
1) You have the right to remain silent.
2) Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court
of law.
3) You have the right to talk to a lawyer and have him present
with you while you are being questioned.
4) If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed
to represent you before any questioning, if you wish one.89
35. Id.
36. The Court referred to "an objectively reasonable need to protect the police or the
public from any immediate danger" and "exigency requiring immediate action by the officers
beyond the normal need expeditiously to solve a serious crime." Id. at 659 n.8.
37. Dicta in Quarles suggest that the exception may be extended to all situations in
which "the cost [of the Miranda rules] would have been something more than merely the
failure to obtain evidence . I..." Id. at 657. Thus, Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion sug-
gests that Miranda is limited to "questions designed solely to elicit testimonial evidence from a
suspect." Id.
38. The quoted phrase is taken from Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 443 (1974).
39. This version is the one used by the San Jose, California Police Department. San
Jose Police Dept. Miranda Admonition Card No. 200-56, (Jan. 1980). For the Court's origi-
1988]
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The Court has not required adherence to any "precise formula-
tion of the warnings."" It is enough if the language used succeeds in
communicating the substance of the four warnings.
Despite numerous efforts by commentators to add new warn-
ings,41 the Court has refused to extend the list. 2
b. Did claimant waive the Miranda rights?
Responses to custodial interrogation are inadmissible to prove
guilt or enhance punishment unless claimant waived the right to re-
main silent and have an attorney present.4" The Court uses a two-
prong test for determining whether a valid waiver occurred."' First,
the waiver must be voluntary.45 Second, the waiver must be know-
ing.4" To make these determinations, the court looks at the totality of
the circumstances.'
7
Waiver may not be inferred from a silent record or from the
mere fact that claimant responded to questions after being warned.' 8
Instead, the government must show by some positive evidence that
claimant made a decision to waive the Miranda rights before re-
sponding."9 The evidence may be thin, however. A word or a gesture
will suffice. Despite language in Miranda about the government's
"heavy burden" and the need for "corroborated evidence," 0 it now
appears that testimony by an officer that claimant was warned and
indicated a willingness to be questioned suffices.
nal formulations, see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467-68, 469, 473, 478-79.
40. California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 359 (1981).
41. The leading candidates for inclusion have been the following: (1) you have the right
to cut off questioning at any time even after you have answered some questions; (2) if you
remain silent, the prosecutor may not comment on that at trial; and (3) you will be asked
about the following crimes.
42. E.g., Colorado v. Spring, 107 S. Ct. 851 (1987) (rejecting a requirement that claim-
ant be warned concerning the crimes which will be the subject of the interrogation).
43. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.
44. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986) ("The [waiver] inquiry has two dis-
tinct dimensions.").
45. "First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it
was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or decep-
tion." Id. at 421.
46. "Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness both of the nature
of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it." Id.
47. Id. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979) (defendant's request to speak with
his probation officer did not invoke right to have attorney present during interrogation).
48. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475.
49. Tague v. Louisiana, 444 U.S. 469 (1980).
50. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475.
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1) Was the waiver voluntary?
To establish a valid waiver, the government must prove that
claimant's choice was voluntary, i.e., not coerced. Relevant factors
include the following: claimant's competence and mental condition,
intimidating police behavior (e.g., physical violence, threats), physi-
cal restraints (e.g., handcuffs), and whether claimant resisted.
Miranda suggested that waivers obtained by "trickery" are not
voluntary,"' but the Court has done little to enforce this dictum.52
2) Was the waiver knowing?
To establish a valid waiver, the government must prove that
claimant was aware of the nature of the Miranda rights.. But there
need not be any detailed inquiry on this score. It is enough if the
warnings were given and claimant was capable of understanding
them at the time, i.e., sufficiently intelligent and not suffering from
any temporary impairment such as intoxication or emotional
disturbance.
The Court has repeatedly stated that a waiver is not "knowing"
unless claimant understands the consequences of giving up the
rights." But claimant's failure to grasp that the statement could be
harmful does not vitiate the waiver."4 The main "consequence"
claimant must.understand is that interrogation will follow and state-
ments may be used at trial. "[W]e have never 'embraced the theory.
that a defendant's ignorance of the full consequences of his decision
vitiates their voluntariness.' 5
c. Were the rules concerning invocation of Miranda
rights obeyed?
If claimant invokes either of the Miranda rights, the govern-
ment must comply with an additional set of rules. The test for deter-
mining whether an invocation has occurred is the "ordinary mean-
ing" of claimant's communication.5 The requirements triggered by
invocation depend on which right is invoked-the right to remain
51. Id. at 476.
52. In Moran, for example, the Court upheld Burbine's waiver even though the police
lied to Burbine's attorney by falsely promising not to interrogate Burbine and refused to tell
Burbine the attorney was trying to see him. Id.
53. Id.
,54. Connecticut v. Barrett, 107 S. Ct. 828, 832 (1987).
55. Id. at 833.
56. Id. at 832.
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silent or the right to an attorney.
1) Invoking the right to remain silent
If claimant invokes the right to remain silent, the questioning
must stop.5 How soon the police may resume the effort to obtain a
waiver is not clear. At a minimum, the police must assure that
claimant's "right to cut off questioning" is "scrupulously honored." '
This means the government must not persist in "repeated efforts to
wear down his resistance and make him change his mind."59 Rele-
vant factors include the length of time between the invocation and
resumption, whether the warnings were repeated, whether there was
a new subject for questioning, whether the second interrogation took
place at a different location, and whether different officers were
involved." °
2) Invoking the right to have an attorney present
In order to invoke the right to an attorney, claimant must indi-
cate that he wishes to consult with an attorney. Asking to speak with
someone else (e.g., a probation officer) does not suffice. 1 Similarly,
asking to speak with an attorney before doing something else (e.g.,
making a written statement) is not an invocation of the right to con-
sult with an attorney before speaking.6
If claimant invokes the right to an attorney, interrogation may
not proceed until an attorney has been made available for consulta-
tion. 8 Indeed, the government may not even seek to obtain a waiver
of the invoked right unless claimant "initiates further communication
. . . with the police."'6 4 The test for such an initiation is whether a
57. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74 ("If the individual indicates in any manner, at any
time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must
cease.").
58. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975) ("We therefore conclude that the
admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent
depends under Miranda on whether his 'right to cut off questioning' was 'scrupulously
honored.' "); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.
59. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 105-06.
60. Id. at 104-06.
61. Fare, 442 U.S. at 707.
62. Barrett, 107 S. Ct. at 828 (defendant's statement that he would not make a written
statement before consulting his attorney did not invoke the right to have attorney present dur-
ing interrogation).
63. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474 ("If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the
interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.").
64. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485 (1981) (defendant's statements held inad-
missible because police conducted interrogation after defendant invoked his right to have an
[Vol. 28
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reasonable officer would have interpreted claimant's communication
as showing "a desire on the part of an accused to open up a more
generalized discussion relating directly or indirectly to the investiga-
tion."' Absent such an initiation by claimant, any alleged waiver of
the invoked right will be deemed invalid."'
If Miranda is inapplicable or all Miranda rules have been sat-
isfied, no Miranda violation is present, and the analysis ends. How-
ever, if the preliminary requirements are met and claimant prevails
on the merits by proving that the government used claimant's re-
sponse to custodial interrogation without complying with the Mi-
randa rules, then the final issue is what remedies are in order.
C. Remedies
1. The exclusionary rule
Statements obtained in violation of the Miranda rules may not
be used to prove guilt or enhance punishment. Thus, the statements
must be excluded from evidence. But, unlike other evidence obtained
in violation of the Constitution, these statements may be used to im-
peach defendant's trial testimony.67 Usually, when constitutionally
based rules are violated, the government also may not use any sec-
ondary evidence derived from the violation in a later criminal prose-
cution. Such derivative evidence is barred, because it is "fruit of the
poisonous tree." 6 However, the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine
is not applicable to Miranda violations, so evidence derived from
such violations may be used as long as the statements themselves are
not used as evidence.69
attorney present and before defendant initiated further communication).
65. In Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983), the Court determined that the de-
fendant's question about "what is going to happen to me" was an initiation of further commu-
nication. Id. at 1045. However, routine questions not relating to the investigation-e.g., a
request for a drink of water-are not "initiations" within the meaning of Edwards.
66. In short, after the suspect invokes the right to an attorney, the government must
satisfy a two-prong test before resuming interrogation: there must be (1) initiation followed by
(2) waiver. Id.
67. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
68. E.g., Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) (evidence de-
rived from illegal seizure must be excluded). Silverthorne is often cited as the seminal case on
the "fruit of the poisonous tree" rule, although the phrase was first coined by Justice Frank-
furter in Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
69. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) (an initial unwarned confession does not bar
the use of a later confession given after warnings and waiver); Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) (a
witness located by interrogation without proper warnings will be allowed to testify).
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2. The harmless error rule
The general rule is that admission of claimant's statements in
violation of Miranda requires that the conviction or sentence based
thereon be overturned. Reversal may not be necessary, however, if
the error was harmless."0 An error is harmless if the reviewing court
concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the tainted evidence could
not have influenced the jury's verdict or that the decision is sup-
ported by overwhelming untainted evidence.
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III. CONCLUSION
Miranda analysis proceeds in three steps. First, preliminary re-
quirements (jurisdiction, justiciability, and government action) must
be met. Second, the merits of the Miranda claim must be considered.
To prevail, claimant must show that Miranda was applicable, i.e.,
the government, without any overriding need, must have used claim-
ant's statement obtained by custodial interrogation to prove guilt or
enhance punishment in a criminal prosecution. Claimant must also
show that Miranda was violated, i.e., that the required warnings
were not given, a waiver of the Miranda rights was not obtained, or
the rules concerning invocation were not obeyed. If Miranda was
applicable and was not complied with, questions concerning reme-
dies must be addressed. By following these steps, law students, law-
yers, and judges may conduct Miranda analyses in an orderly and
accurate fashion.
APPENDIX
On the basis of the foregoing discussion, it is possible to set
forth the following, more detailed outline of Miranda analysis.
70. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967). The Court has not yet decided
whether Miranda violations are subject to the harmless error or automatic reversal rule. Given
the Court's relentless hostility to Miranda, the former seems likely. Actually, a good argument
can be made that the harmless error rule should not be used, because statements taken in
violation of Miranda may be unreliable, and case-by-case application of the harmless error
rule would defeat the whole purpose of Miranda's "bright line" rules.




I. Have the preliminary requirements been met?
A. Does the court have jurisdiction?
B. Is the claim justiciable?
C. Was the harm caused by government action?
II. On the merits: was Miranda violated?
A. Is Miranda applicable?
1. Was a statement obtained by custodial interrogation?
a. Was claimant in custody?
1) Test: would a reasonable person have considered
the situation to be as coercive as a custodial
arrest?
b. Did interrogation occur?
1) Express questions
a) GR: express questions comprise interroga-
tion.
b) EXCS
i) Routine arrest or booking questions
ii) Questions not concerning merits of case
iii) Questions clarifying volunteered state-
ments (likely but not settled)
2) Functional equivalent of express questions, i.e.,
a) Words or conduct,
b) Reasonable officer would know,
c) Reasonably likely to elicit incriminating
statements,
d) Taking account of characteristics of suspect
the police know or should know about.
c. Was claimant's statement a response to custodial
interrogation, i.e., not a volunteered statement?
2. Did the government introduce the statement in a
criminal prosecution to prove guilt or enhance punish-
ment?
3. Did the need for Miranda protections outweigh other
government needs for immediate questioning?
B. Did the government comply with the Miranda rules?
1. Were the required warnings given?
a. Right to remain silent
b. Statements can be used in court
c. Right to have an attorney
d. Right to appointed attorney if indigent
2. Did claimant waive the Miranda rights?
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a. Was the waiver voluntary?
b. Was the waiver knowing?
3. Did the government comply with rules concerning
invocation of the Miranda rights?
a. If the right to remain silent was invoked, did the
government scrupulously honor the right to cut off
questioning?
b. If the right to an attorney was invoked,
1) Was an attorney made available for consulta-
tion?
2) If not,
a) Did claimant initiate further discussion?
b) Did claimant waive the invoked right?
III. Remedies
A. Exclusionary rule
B. Harmless error rule
